Objective-Based Investing
The quarter began with investors focused on geopolitical risk and the possibility that conflict in the Middle East would deliver a sustained energy-driven inflation shock. As tensions eased, that concern faded, but it was quickly replaced by a different set of worries. Core inflation prints remained sticky while the Fed's reaction function became less certain under new Chair Kevin Warsh, leading the markets to raise the probability that the next meaningful policy move could be a hike rather than a cut.
At the same time, the rates market shifted its attention toward the scale and financing of the artificial intelligence buildout. Investors became increasingly worried about increased corporate issuance, and whether the heavy investment would sustain above-trend economic growth and keep inflation elevated. That combination lifted U.S. Treasury yields to recent highs and pushed spreads wider on tech related corporate bonds. In our U.S. Rates Team’s view, however, the market may be treating several distinct risks as though they all point in the same direction. The result is a valuation opportunity in high-quality, longer-maturity bonds.
The easing of Middle East tensions could remove an important near-term tail risk. Lower geopolitical risk should reduce the chance of an acute oil shock but may not restore confidence in the disinflation process. A run of sticky inflation readings suggested that progress toward the Fed’s objective could remain uneven, particularly in categories where prices are directly boosted by the AI buildout.
The June Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting added to that caution. Fed policymakers reaffirmed their commitment to price stability, reopening the door to a potential tightening cycle if inflation remained stubbornly above their target. By emphasizing that inflation risks remained alive and that policy would respond if necessary, the Fed reminded investors that cuts were not guaranteed and that hikes could return to the distribution of outcomes. Markets responded by raising rate-hike probabilities and pushing bond yields higher.
That repricing has been reinforced by a broader concern about capital formation. The largest technology companies are planning substantial spending on data centres, semiconductors, power infrastructure and related capacity. Because a portion of that spending may be financed in the bond market, investors worry that heavier corporate issuance will meet already-large sovereign supply. The fear is not only technical. If investment spending keeps demand strong, some worry it could delay the cooling in inflation that would benefit longer-maturity bonds.
The bond supply concern is real. More issuance can raise the yield investors require, particularly when balance-sheet capacity is constrained and the market is already absorbing elevated government borrowing. But the macroeconomic effects of the AI investment cycle are more nuanced than a simple “more capex, more inflation, higher yields” framework implies.
First, investment that raises productivity can be disinflationary over time. If firms can produce more output with the same labour and capital inputs, unit costs can fall even while real activity remains healthy. Stronger productivity would allow the economy to grow faster without generating the same degree of wage and price pressure. The near-term construction of data centres may be resource intensive, but the eventual payoff could expand productive capacity and lower the inflation rate consistent with a given pace of growth.
Second, the current inflation problem appears concentrated in areas like food and energy rather than appearing uniformly broad. Sticky inflation readings matter, but they have not necessarily signalled a generalized reacceleration across the entire consumption basket. When inflation is isolated in a limited number of categories, the hurdle for a durable shift back to accelerating inflation is higher. It also means that strong investment spending does not automatically translate into economy-wide pricing power.
Inflation pressures appear concentrated, not broad-based
Sources: U.S. Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, San Francisco and Dallas. As of 6/30/26. Core Sticky CPI (three-month annualized) is the Atlanta Fed Core Sticky-Price Consumer Price Index, measured as a three-month annualized rate. Cyclical Core PCE (YoY) is the San Francisco Fed Cyclical Core Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index, measured as a year-over-year change. Trimmed Mean PCE (1-year) is the Dallas Fed Trimmed Mean Personal Consumption Expenditures Inflation Rate, measured on a 12-month basis.
Third, not every dollar of AI-related capital expenditure is directly accretive to U.S. activity. A meaningful share of the supply chain sits abroad, including semiconductor fabrication, equipment production and other imported inputs. Some spending therefore leaks into foreign production rather than becoming a one-for-one boost to U.S. demand. This global footprint can mute the effect on domestic growth, labour utilization and inflation, even if headline corporate investment numbers remain large.
The timing also matters. Markets tend to capitalize announced spending immediately, while the actual economic impulse arrives over several quarters and may be offset by depreciation, displacement of other projects or weaker spending elsewhere. Corporate supply can pressure yields in the short run, but it does not follow that the full buildout should be treated as a permanent increase in the neutral rate.
The supply impact could be more structural for the yield curve. As technology companies increasingly use the corporate bond market to finance the AI-buildout, and rely on long-dated bond issuance, long-end yields have moved higher and the curve has steepened. If this trend continues, the markets will price term premium higher which should contribute to a structurally steeper yield curve.
The case for owning duration begins with valuation. Current yields provide substantial carry, and an upward sloping curve offers the potential for positive appreciation (roll) as bonds age. That income potential can create a cushion against modest further increases in yields and can reduce the reliance on an immediate rally to generate returns.
History is also encouraging. When bond valuations have reached similarly attractive levels, subsequent returns have skewed positive, even when the path was volatile and the timing of the policy turn was uncertain. The key point is not that yields cannot rise further. They can. It is that investors are being paid more generously to hold duration than they were through much of the post-global-financial-crisis period, and the starting yield is an important driver of medium-term total return.
Forward bond returns have historically tended to skew positive around today's yield levels
Sources: Capital Group, U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Federal Reserve Economic Data – FRED). As of 6/30/26. Historical monthly returns are based on a reconstructed 5-year U.S. Treasury return series using data from FRED starting in 1962. Returns are in USD. Observations were filtered to 110 periods when the starting 5-year Treasury yield was between 4% and 5%. For each qualifying month, the subsequent one-month total return was calculated and grouped into return buckets to create the distribution shown. Past results are not predictive of future outcomes.
High real yields are particularly notable. They embed a demanding combination of resilient growth, heavy supply and a restrictive policy stance. For those expectations to be realized, several things must go right at once: productivity gains must fail to relieve inflation, investment must remain strongly additive to domestic demand, the labour market must avoid meaningful cooling and the Fed must ultimately validate the market’s more hawkish path. That is possible, but it is a high bar.
The June meeting was hawkish as the Fed reaffirmed its commitment to its 2% target; the July meeting was dovish as policy rates were left unchanged. The policy outlook remains two-sided. It is unclear if the Fed will, under Warsh’s new leadership, address sticky inflation with higher interest rates, tighter balance sheet policy or both, and its new policy of providing no forward guidance adds to the uncertainty. Meanwhile, the Fed is also watching labour demand, financial conditions and the cumulative effect of restrictive real rates. A few sticky inflation prints can keep cuts at bay, but they do not by themselves establish a new hiking cycle, particularly if they are not broadly driven.
This distinction matters for duration. Investors do not need the Fed to cut quickly for longer-maturity bonds to generate positive returns. Stable policy, moderate nominal growth or a decline in term premium could all support returns. Duration would also regain its traditional hedging value if the investment cycle disappoints, corporate issuance becomes more difficult to absorb or the labour market weakens more sharply than expected.
The market has moved from pricing a relatively benign easing cycle to assigning more weight to a renewed tightening scenario. That repricing has improved forward returns. In our Rates Team’s view, the distribution of outcomes is now more balanced than market pricing suggests: inflation may remain sticky, but productivity, global supply chain leakage and falling wage growth all argue against treating higher rates as inevitable.
Wage growth in the U.S. has continued to moderate from post-pandemic highs
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. As of 6/30/26. Figures shown represent the Atlanta Fed’s Wage Growth Tracker, which is a measure of the nominal wage growth of individuals. The tracker reports the median percent change in the hourly wage of individuals observed 12 months apart in USD.
Our Rates Team favours long duration because it offers both income and convexity at a time when macro uncertainty is high. Carry and roll are attractive, valuations have historically been associated with positive forward bond returns and the policy path is not definitively moving toward hikes. The AI buildout may keep volatility elevated and create periodic supply-driven selloffs, but those episodes can improve entry points rather than invalidate the strategic case.
The central question is whether debt-financed investment creates a lasting, broad-based inflation problem. We are not convinced that it does. If AI spending raises productivity, if inflation remains concentrated and if part of the investment impulse accrues outside the United States, the effect on domestic rates should be more muted than the market fears. Against that backdrop, today’s yields provide meaningful compensation for patience.
Bond markets are unlikely to move in a straight line. Sticky data or stronger issuance calendars can still push yields higher in the near term. But long-term investors do not need perfect timing. With real yields elevated and the Fed retaining flexibility in both directions, high-quality duration remains an attractive source of carry and source of portfolio diversification in a downside growth scenario.
The U.S. Rates Team approaches interest rate research using a four-factor framework across economic fundamentals, policy fundamentals, valuations and technicals to arrive at recommended positioning for fixed income portfolios across duration, yield curve and inflation expressions. The views of individual portfolio managers and analysts may differ.
Tim Ng is a portfolio manager for Capital Group Canadian Core Plus Fixed Income Fund (Canada).
A spread over Treasuries is the difference between the yield of a bond and the yield of a similar maturity Treasury bond.
Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to changes in interest rates. Generally speaking, a bond's price will go up 1% for every year of duration if interest rates fall by 1% or down 1% for every year of duration if interest rates rise by 1%. When an investor talks about “owning duration,” this means that they have exposure to interest rate risk.
In simple terms, bond “carry” is equal to coupon income minus the cost of funding.
Fixed income “roll” is the capital gain earned on a bond as it approaches maturity, assuming the yield curve remains unchanged. Typically, as a bond gets closer to its maturity date, its yield declines, forcing its price to increase, which then allows investors to sell it for more than they purchased it for while collecting coupon income.
Real yield refers to the return on an investment after accounting for inflation -- it is the nominal yield adjusted to reflect the erosion of purchasing power due to inflation.
Convexity measures how a bond’s price sensitivity to interest-rate changes evolves as yields move. Higher-convexity bonds tend to benefit more from declining yields than they are hurt by equivalent increases in yields.
Core inflation is a measure of the rising cost of goods and services that excludes food and energy items.
Sticky inflation refers to sustained increases in wages and prices of certain consumer goods that usually don't change frequently or dramatically.
An "inflation print" refers to new inflation data releases.
Objective-Based Investing
Active Management
Demographics & Culture
Trade
RELATED INSIGHTS
Commissions, trailing commissions, management fees and expenses all may be associated with investments in investment funds. Please read the prospectus before investing. Investment funds are not guaranteed or covered by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation or by any other government deposit insurer. For investment funds other than money market funds, their values change frequently. For money market funds, there can be no assurances that the fund will be able to maintain its net asset value per security at a constant amount or that the full amount of your investment in the fund will be returned to you. Past performance may not be repeated.
Unless otherwise indicated, the investment professionals featured do not manage Capital Group‘s Canadian investment funds.
References to particular companies or securities, if any, are included for informational or illustrative purposes only and should not be considered as an endorsement by Capital Group. Views expressed regarding a particular company, security, industry or market sector should not be considered an indication of trading intent of any investment funds or current holdings of any investment funds. These views should not be considered as investment advice nor should they be considered a recommendation to buy or sell.
Statements attributed to an individual represent the opinions of that individual as of the date published and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Capital Group or its affiliates. This information is intended to highlight issues and not be comprehensive or to provide advice. For informational purposes only; not intended to provide tax, legal or financial advice. Capital Group funds are available in Canada through registered dealers. For more information, please consult your financial and tax advisors for your individual situation.
Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance, and actual events and results could differ materially from those expressed or implied in any forward-looking statements made herein. We encourage you to consider these and other factors carefully before making any investment decisions and we urge you to avoid placing undue reliance on forward-looking statements.
The S&P 500 Composite Index (“Index”) is a product of S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC and/or its affiliates and has been licensed for use by Capital Group. Copyright © 2026 S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, a division of S&P Global, and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Redistribution or reproduction in whole or in part are prohibited without written permission of S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC.
FTSE source: London Stock Exchange Group plc and its group undertakings (collectively, the "LSE Group"). © LSE Group 2026. FTSE Russell is a trading name of certain of the LSE Group companies. "FTSE®" is a trade mark of the relevant LSE Group companies and is used by any other LSE Group company under licence. All rights in the FTSE Russell indices or data vest in the relevant LSE Group company which owns the index or the data. Neither LSE Group nor its licensors accept any liability for any errors or omissions in the indices or data and no party may rely on any indices or data contained in this communication. No further distribution of data from the LSE Group is permitted without the relevant LSE Group company's express written consent. The LSE Group does not promote, sponsor or endorse the content of this communication. The index is unmanaged and cannot be invested in directly.
BLOOMBERG® is a trademark and service mark of Bloomberg Finance L.P. and its affiliates (collectively “Bloomberg”). Bloomberg or Bloomberg’s licensors own all proprietary rights in the Bloomberg Indices. Neither Bloomberg nor Bloomberg’s licensors approves or endorses this material, or guarantees the accuracy or completeness of any information herein, or makes any warranty, express or implied, as to the results to be obtained therefrom and, to the maximum extent allowed by law, neither shall have any liability or responsibility for injury or damages arising in connection therewith.
The MSCI information may only be used for your internal use, may not be reproduced or redisseminated in any form and may not be used as a basis for or a component of any financial instruments or products or indices. None of the MSCI information is intended to constitute investment advice or a recommendation to make (or refrain from making) any kind of investment decision and may not be relied on as such. Historical data and analysis should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of any future performance analysis, forecast or prediction. The MSCI information is provided on an “as is” basis and the user of this information assumes the entire risk of any use made of this information. MSCI, each of its affiliates and each other person involved in or related to compiling, computing or creating any MSCI information (collectively, the “MSCI Parties”) expressly disclaims all warranties (including, without limitation, any warranties of originality, accuracy, completeness, timeliness, non-infringement, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose) with respect to this information. Without limiting any of the foregoing, in no event shall any MSCI Party have any liability for any direct, indirect, special, incidental, punitive, consequential (including, without limitation, lost profits) or any other damages. (www.msci.com)
Capital believes the software and information from FactSet to be reliable. However, Capital cannot be responsible for inaccuracies, incomplete information or updating of the information furnished by FactSet. The information provided in this report is meant to give you an approximate account of the fund/manager's characteristics for the specified date. This information is not indicative of future Capital investment decisions and is not used as part of our investment decision-making process.
Indices are unmanaged and cannot be invested in directly. Returns represent past performance, are not a guarantee of future performance, and are not indicative of any specific investment.
All Capital Group trademarks are owned by The Capital Group Companies, Inc. or an affiliated company in Canada, the U.S. and other countries. All other company names mentioned are the property of their respective companies.
Capital Group funds are offered in Canada by Capital International Asset Management (Canada), Inc., part of Capital Group, a global investment management firm originating in Los Angeles, California in 1931. Capital Group manages equity assets through three investment groups. These groups make investment and proxy voting decisions independently. Fixed income investment professionals provide fixed income research and investment management across the Capital organization; however, for securities with equity characteristics, they act solely on behalf of one of the three equity investment groups.
The Capital Group funds offered on this website are available only to Canadian residents.